# CellGuard — Project Dossier (rango / Pixel 10 Pro Fold)

Kernel-enforced cellular security for a stock-GKI Pixel: block 2G/3G + weak/null
ciphers, force LTE/5G-SA, detect IMSI-catchers/stingrays. This dossier records
everything established so far — device facts, the solved build/load problem, the
reverse-engineered modem control path, and the detection/blocking architecture.

---

## 1. Device baseline
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Device | Pixel 10 Pro Fold, `rango`, Tensor G5 (`laguna`) |
| Modem | Samsung **Shannon S5400** via **cpif/PCIe** (no UART AT) |
| Kernel | stock GKI `6.6.102-android15-8-g6eb5b2a8c46b-ab14739656-4k` |
| Kernel cfg | RANDSTRUCT_NONE, CFI_CLANG (strict), MODVERSIONS, LTO_NONE, **MODULE_SIG_PROTECT**, MODULE_SIG_FORCE **off**, KPROBES=y |
| Root | KernelSU **LKM** |
| Bootloader | unlocked (props spoofed locked/green) |
| RIL | `/vendor/bin/hw/rild_exynos` + `libsitril*` (SIT protocol) |

---

## 2. Kernel module build & load — **SOLVED**

### Root cause of the original failures
1. **`Exec format error`** — the shipped `cellguard.ko` was built against a
   **GrapheneOS** `laguna` kernel tree (`6.6.129`, `RANDSTRUCT_FULL`). Under
   MODVERSIONS the kernel ignores the release string but compares the vermagic
   **flag suffix** + symbol CRCs; the RANDSTRUCT flag and mismatched CRCs
   (`module_layout` etc.) → `ENOEXEC`.
2. **`Protected symbol: kernel_write/kernel_read (-13)`** — stock GKI
   `MODULE_SIG_PROTECT` lets unsigned modules load but forbids importing a
   protected symbol subset. `kernel_read`/`kernel_write` are protected.

### Fix
- **Build against stock GKI**, not Graphene: cloned `kernel/common` at the exact
  build SHA `6eb5b2a8c46b`, used the device's real `/proc/config.gz`, and the
  build's `vmlinux.symvers` (real CRCs). Native Debian **clang 19** (kCFI
  type-IDs are ABI-stable across clang versions). Result vermagic flags +
  all 49 harvestable CRCs (incl. `module_layout 0x4e276f37`) match the device.
- **Resolve protected symbols at runtime**: `cellguard.c` now bootstraps
  `kallsyms_lookup_name` via a one-shot **kprobe** (`cg_lookup_name`) and calls
  `kernel_read`/`kernel_write` through pointers (`cg_kernel_read/write`,
  `cg_resolve_protected`). Zero protected symbols imported → loads unsigned, and
  is **portable across all stock android15/6.6 GKI devices** (KMI-frozen imports).

### Result
`insmod` succeeds; `/dev/cellguard` (major 475) + `/proc/cellguard/status` live;
module inert by default. Confirmed loaded via the KSU module path
(`/data/adb/modules/cellguard/common/kmod/cellguard.ko`, loaded by `service.sh`).

### Artifacts
- `common/kmod/cellguard.ko` — working stock-GKI build (sha256 `676ee6d1…`)
- `common/kmod/cellguard.ko.badvermagic` — old broken build (backup)
- `common/kmod/build-stock-gki.sh` — reproducible pipeline (auto-detects build,
  downloads GKI artifacts, clones exact source, builds)
- `common/kmod/device.config` — offline config fallback

---

## 3. Modem control path — reverse-engineered (cpif / SIPC5)

**Key finding: rango exposes NO AT tty.** The DT `iodevs` node has no
`umts_atc*`/`nr_atc*`; `cpif.ko` contains zero AT strings and no AT parser. Both
`cellguard.c` and RadioControl's `rc_shannon_cmd.c` assume an AT tty that does
not exist — they only ever opened `/dev/umts_router` (a RAW relay) by luck, where
`AT+…` bytes become an opaque SIPC5 payload the modem ignores.

Channel names are **not in the driver** — `cpif` reads them from the device tree
(`parse_dt_iodevs_pdata`). Extracted from the decompiled DTB (dtbo → `iodevs`):

### rango channel map (DT `iodevs`, enums proven vs `cpif.ko`)
| /dev node | iod,ch | format | io_type | attrs | role |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `umts_ipc0/1` | 0xf5 | FMT | MISC | 0x6000 | primary control — **held by RIL** |
| **`oem_ipc0..7`** | **0x81** | **FMT** | MISC | 0x2000 | **OEM/SIT control (best for us)** |
| `oem_test` | 0x89 | RAW | MISC | 0 | OEM test sink |
| `umts_router` | 0x15 | RAW | MISC | 0 | opaque relay (no command parser) |
| `umts_dm0` | 0x51 | RAW/DIAG | MISC | 0x4000 | **CP diagnostic egress (detection)** |
| `rmnet` | 0xb5 | RAW | NET | 0x2000 | packet data (30 ch) |
| `umts_rfs0` | 0x29 | RAW | MISC | 0 | remote fs |
| `umts_boot0` | 0xf1 | BOOT | BOOTDUMP | 0x4200 | modem boot/flash |
| `umts_rcs0/1`,`umts_wfc0/1`,`gnss_*`,`esim_tracer` | … | … | … | … | misc |

Enum decodings (proven in `cpif.ko`): `iod,format {0=FMT,1=RAW,3=MULTI_RAW,4=BOOT}`;
`iod,io_type {0=BOOTDUMP,1=MISC(char dev),2=NET,3=DUMMY}` (jump table
`sipc5_init_io_device` @0xce78); `attrs` bit8 `0x100`=NO_LINK_HEADER,
bit13 `0x2000`=MULTI_CHANNEL.

### Framing contract — **PROVEN** from `cpif.ko` (non-stripped)
cpif frames/deframes **SIPC5 itself**; userspace exchanges **bare payloads**:
- **TX** `ipc_write@0x1ad8`: `_copy_from_user` the buffer verbatim as payload,
  `skb_push(4)`, then `sipc5_build_config@0xccc8` (config base **0xF8**) +
  `sipc5_build_header@0xcd80` (`hdr[1]=iod,ch` from DT). On the wire a small
  frame = **`F8 <ch> <u16 len LE> <payload>`**. The channel byte + header come
  from the kernel — **never prepend your own**.
- **RX** `rx_fmt_ipc@0xd87c` / `rx_raw_misc@0xdde0`: `skb_pull` the SIPC5 header,
  queue bare payload to `iod->rxq (+0x138)`; `ipc_read@0x18c4` returns **bare
  binary payload** (no `\r\n`, no `OK/ERROR`).
- FMT channels carry a 7-bit transaction id (`sipc5_build_config` @0xcd60) →
  request/reply correlation. RAW channels don't (why `oem_ipc` FMT beats
  `umts_router` RAW for control).

### Corrected driver design (proposed patch, not yet applied)
- `modem_paths[]` → `{umts_dm0, oem_ipc, umts_router}` (drop nonexistent AT ttys)
- `at_cmd()` → bare-payload I/O; **no** CRLF, **no** OK/ERROR scan
- add `sit_tx_enabled` gate, **default false** = passive/read-only, **zero
  baseband TX** (honors the modem-sensitivity rule)
- same fix for `rc_shannon_cmd.c`; note it also needs the kprobe/kallsyms
  bootstrap before it can load on stock GKI

---

## 4. IMSI-catcher detection + band blocking — architecture

Maximum control = a kernel module at the **cpif SIPC5 layer**, three stacked
capabilities:

1. **Detection — DIAG (`umts_dm0`, ch 0x51), passive/read-only.** CP diagnostic
   stream carries layer-3 (RRC/NAS), cell measurements, cipher/auth params,
   paging. Flag: forced 2G/3G downgrade, null/weak cipher (A5/0, EEA0/NEA0),
   IMSI/IMEI identity requests, silent paging/SMS, abnormal cell (LAC/TAC without
   handover, MCC/MNC mismatch, implausible signal), skipped AKA. Reference:
   **P1sec SCAT** parses Samsung/Shannon DM.
2. **Blocking — SIT over `oem_ipc` 0x81 / `umts_ipc` 0xf5 (FMT).**
   `SET_ALLOWED_NETWORK_TYPE` → LTE+NR only; band-lock; null-cipher-off. Needs
   the SIT opcodes (RE in progress).
3. **Max control — kprobe-hook `cpif`** (symbols in kallsyms): hook RX
   (`rx_fmt_ipc`,`rx_raw_misc`) to see *all* AP↔CP frames; hook TX
   (`ipc_write`/`sipc5_build_header`) to **veto/rewrite** commands so 2G/3G can't
   be re-enabled behind us — a baseband IDS/firewall at the driver boundary.

Build order: (1) passive DIAG detector now → (2) SIT blocking after opcode RE →
(3) cpif kprobe hooks.

---

## 5. SIT / DIAG RE — in progress
Pulled read-only to `/home/snake/re/`: `rild_exynos`, `libsitril.so`,
`libril_sitril.so`, `libsit_oem.so`, `libsit_oem_proto.so`,
`libsitril-client.so`, `vendor.radio.protocol.sit.{base,stream}.so`.

Control handlers confirmed in `libsitril.so` strings:
- RAT: `NETWORK_TYPE_BITMAP_LTE_ONLY` / `_LTE_WCDMA` / `_GSM_ONLY` …
  (setAllowedNetworkType)
- Band: `DoSetBandMode` / `DoSetManualBandMode` / `DoQueryAvailableBandMode`
- Cipher: `IsNullCipherAndIntegrityEnabledHandler` (+ Set)

**Fable RE workflow running** (`rango-sit-diag-re`) to extract: the on-wire SIT
frame layout (`vendor.radio.protocol.sit.stream.so`), the main/sub command IDs +
param encoding for RAT/band/cipher, and the Shannon DM/DIAG record framing (SCAT).
Output: SIT encoder spec + DIAG parser spec + proposed cellguard code blocks.

---

## 6. Toolchain & artifact locations
| What | Where |
|---|---|
| cellguard source | `/home/snake/CellGuard/common/kmod/cellguard.c` |
| build pipeline | `/home/snake/CellGuard/common/kmod/build-stock-gki.sh` |
| stock kernel src (KDIR) | scratchpad `src/common` (@ SHA `6eb5b2a8c46b`) |
| cpif driver (RE, non-stripped) | scratchpad `re/cpif_factory.ko` |
| decompiled DT | scratchpad `re/alldts.txt` (`iodevs` @ line 4911) |
| SIT/RIL binaries | `/home/snake/re/` |
| Ghidra | `/home/snake/tools/samsung-dev/ghidra_12.0.4_PUBLIC/` (headless in `support/`) |
| RadioControl twin module | `/home/snake/RadioControl/common/kmod/rc_shannon_cmd.c` |

---

## 7. Constraints (standing rules)
- **No device ops (adb/insmod/push) without explicit per-action permission.**
- **Never TX to the baseband without consent** — malformed OEM/FMT frames can
  reset the modem; `setenforce` also bounces RIL. Default builds are passive.
- No AI attribution in any code/output. No stubs. `/home/snake` not `/tmp`
  (Pi `/tmp` is RAM). Surgical edits, one change at a time.

---

## 8. Next steps
1. Finish SIT/DIAG RE (workflow) → SIT encoder + DIAG parser specs.
2. Apply the corrected-channel/framing patch (passive/read-only default) →
   rebuild → load via KSU path.
3. Add the Shannon-DIAG detector (SCAT-derived) → real IMSI-catcher detection.
4. After opcode verification, gate-enable SIT blocking (RAT/band/cipher).
5. Optional: cpif kprobe RX/TX hooks for full monitor + veto enforcement.
6. Port `rc_shannon_cmd.c` to the same I/O layer + kallsyms bootstrap.

## 9. Backlog (deferred)
- **IMSI-paging blocker (toggle).** No exposed modem command suppresses IMSI-paged
  responses (paging is baseband-autonomous). Buildable tiers:
  1. Force **IMSI/SUPI encryption** via SIT `DoSetCarrierInfoImsiEncryption`
     (stops IMSI harvesting at the source) — available command, needs capture/verify.
  2. **Detect + react**: flag IMSI paging from captured frames → toggle triggers
     detach / RAT-relock / alert.
  3. **True suppression**: modem.bin firmware patch to drop IMSI-paged responses
     (deep, risky — separate effort).

- **Full modem diagnostic-features access** (interactive DIAG/engineering mode,
  band control, signaling readouts) is a **separate app** (RadioControl scope),
  not CellGuard. CellGuard's raw CP-frame capture (`cgcap`) exists only to feed
  detection.

Related: device anti-forensics hardening plan → `docs/anti-forensics-hardening.md`.