cam-mitm/services/intruder_watch.py

"""
Intruder watch — detects unauthorized parties interacting with the camera.

Watches the raw socket for:
  1. Any LAN host that isn't us, the router, or the camera, exchanging traffic
     with the camera.
  2. ARP replies for the camera's IP coming from a MAC that isn't the camera —
     i.e. someone else is ARP-spoofing.
  3. Outbound packets from the camera to destinations not on the known cloud
     whitelist (suggests new C2 / unknown firmware behavior).
  4. New TCP/UDP destination ports the camera initiates that we haven't seen.

Findings are pushed to utils.log AND to a shared `intruders` deque the GUI
reads from for the Intruders tab.
"""

import socket
import struct
import threading
import time
from collections import deque
from datetime import datetime

from utils.log import log, C_ERROR, C_SUCCESS, C_IMPORTANT, C_TRAFFIC

# Shared state the GUI inspects
intruders = deque(maxlen=500)
_intruder_lock = threading.Lock()

# Known cloud destinations the camera is *expected* to talk to (from findings.md).
# Anything outside this set is suspicious.
KNOWN_CLOUD_NETS = [
    # Tencent Cloud (P2P relay, COS)
    ("43.0.0.0",   8),
    ("119.28.0.0", 14),
    ("129.226.0.0", 15),
    ("150.109.0.0", 16),
    # Alibaba Cloud (OSS, OTA)
    ("8.208.0.0",  12),
    ("47.74.0.0",  15),
    ("47.88.0.0",  13),
    ("118.178.0.0", 15),
    # AWS (NTP buckets)
    ("3.64.0.0",   12),
    ("54.93.0.0",  16),
    # Akamai (connectivity check, microsoft etc.)
    ("23.0.0.0",   8),
    ("104.64.0.0", 10),
    # Microsoft / Apple / Amazon connectivity checks
    ("17.0.0.0",   8),     # Apple
    ("13.64.0.0",  11),    # Microsoft
    ("52.0.0.0",   8),     # Amazon
    # qq.com (Tencent connectivity probe)
    ("182.254.0.0", 16),
]


def _ip_to_int(ip):
    return struct.unpack("!I", socket.inet_aton(ip))[0]


def _in_net(ip, base, prefix):
    ip_i = _ip_to_int(ip)
    base_i = _ip_to_int(base)
    mask = (0xFFFFFFFF << (32 - prefix)) & 0xFFFFFFFF
    return (ip_i & mask) == (base_i & mask)


def _is_known_cloud(ip):
    for base, prefix in KNOWN_CLOUD_NETS:
        if _in_net(ip, base, prefix):
            return True
    return False


def _is_lan(ip):
    return ip.startswith("192.168.") or ip.startswith("10.") or ip.startswith("172.")


def _record(kind, src, dst, detail):
    ts = datetime.now().strftime("%H:%M:%S")
    entry = {"ts": ts, "kind": kind, "src": src, "dst": dst, "detail": detail}
    with _intruder_lock:
        intruders.append(entry)
    log(f"INTRUDER [{kind}] {src} -> {dst}  {detail}", C_IMPORTANT)


def get_intruders():
    with _intruder_lock:
        return list(intruders)


def clear_intruders():
    with _intruder_lock:
        intruders.clear()


def run(cfg, flags, running_check):
    try:
        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, socket.htons(0x0003))
        sock.bind((cfg["iface"], 0))
        sock.settimeout(1)
    except Exception as e:
        log(f"IntruderWatch: cannot open raw socket: {e}", C_ERROR)
        return

    flags["intruder"] = True
    log("IntruderWatch: armed", C_SUCCESS)

    cam_ip = cfg["camera_ip"]
    cam_mac = cfg["camera_mac"].lower()
    our_ip = cfg["our_ip"]
    router_ip = cfg["router_ip"]

    seen_lan_peers = set()      # other LAN hosts that contacted the camera
    seen_outbound = set()       # (dst_ip, proto, port) tuples
    seen_arp_macs = set()       # MACs claiming to be the camera

    while running_check():
        try:
            pkt, _ = sock.recvfrom(65535)
        except socket.timeout:
            continue
        except Exception:
            break

        if len(pkt) < 14:
            continue

        eth_proto = struct.unpack("!H", pkt[12:14])[0]
        eth_src = ":".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in pkt[6:12])
        eth_dst = ":".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in pkt[0:6])

        # ── ARP (0x0806) ────────────────────────────────────────────
        if eth_proto == 0x0806 and len(pkt) >= 42:
            arp = pkt[14:42]
            opcode = struct.unpack("!H", arp[6:8])[0]
            sender_mac = ":".join(f"{b:02x}" for b in arp[8:14])
            sender_ip = socket.inet_ntoa(arp[14:18])
            if opcode == 2 and sender_ip == cam_ip and sender_mac != cam_mac:
                key = sender_mac
                if key not in seen_arp_macs:
                    seen_arp_macs.add(key)
                    _record("ARP_SPOOF", sender_mac, cam_ip,
                            f"someone else claims to be camera (real={cam_mac})")
            continue

        # ── IPv4 (0x0800) ───────────────────────────────────────────
        if eth_proto != 0x0800 or len(pkt) < 34:
            continue

        ip_hdr = pkt[14:34]
        ihl = (ip_hdr[0] & 0x0F) * 4
        proto = ip_hdr[9]
        src_ip = socket.inet_ntoa(ip_hdr[12:16])
        dst_ip = socket.inet_ntoa(ip_hdr[16:20])

        # Camera is involved?
        if cam_ip not in (src_ip, dst_ip):
            continue

        peer_ip = dst_ip if src_ip == cam_ip else src_ip

        t_start = 14 + ihl
        sp = dp = 0
        if proto in (6, 17) and len(pkt) >= t_start + 4:
            sp, dp = struct.unpack("!HH", pkt[t_start:t_start + 4])

        # ── Rule 1: LAN peer that isn't us/router/camera ────────────
        if _is_lan(peer_ip) and peer_ip not in (our_ip, router_ip, cam_ip):
            if peer_ip not in seen_lan_peers:
                seen_lan_peers.add(peer_ip)
                _record("LAN_PEER", peer_ip, cam_ip,
                        f"unknown LAN host talking to camera (proto={proto} port={dp or sp})")

        # ── Rule 2: outbound to non-whitelisted internet ────────────
        if src_ip == cam_ip and not _is_lan(peer_ip):
            if not _is_known_cloud(peer_ip):
                key = (peer_ip, proto, dp)
                if key not in seen_outbound:
                    seen_outbound.add(key)
                    _record("UNKNOWN_DST", cam_ip, peer_ip,
                            f"camera contacting unlisted host (proto={proto} dport={dp})")

    sock.close()
    flags["intruder"] = False
    log("IntruderWatch: stopped", C_SUCCESS)